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DRAFT:  21 June 1972

SUBJECT: Consumer Participation in the NIE/SNIE Program


#### PROBLEM

1. To respond to the Presidential directive that the national intelligence product be improved by providing for increased involvement of high level consumers in the formulation of the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) and Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) programs and in the evaluation of the NIE and SNIE output.

#### INTRODUCTION

2. The President's memorandum of 5 November 1971, "Organization and Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community," and NSCID No. 1, "Basic Duties and Responsibilities," 17 February 1972, which called upon the Director of Central Intelligence to improve the "quality, scope and timeliness of the community's product", represent explicit criticism of the national intelligence product, although the finger is not pointed specifically at any particular type of intelligence publication.

3. Since the NIE and SNIE documents represent the primary community-coordinated output of U.S. intelligence, and since these estimates are intended for the use of high-level consumers, it appears



appropriate that attention be directed to exploration of means by which the NIE/SNIE program could be made more responsive to the needs of the policy making levels of the federal government. The proposals considered relate to three aspects of the NIE program and two aspects of the SNIE program:

- a. The input of NSC, State Department and Defense Department recommendations during development of the annual and quarterly NIE production schedules. (There is no comparable scheduling program for the SNIEs.)
- b. The participation of offices not a part of the intelligence community in review of NIEs and SNIEs during the drafting process.
- c. The preparation of specific evaluations on individual NIEs and SNIE by senior level customers.

4. Since the National Security Council Intelligence Committee (NSCIC) was established to "give direction and guidance on national substantive intelligence needs and provide for a continuing evaluation of intelligence products from the viewpoint of the intelligence consumer," the following discussion of the NIE and SNIE programs focuses on the manner in which the NSCIC and its subordinate body, the NSCIC Working Group, could be utilized.

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## DISCUSSION

Developing the NIE Program

5. The NIE program is promulgated each quarter. The schedule is initiated by the Director of National Estimates and is concurred in by the Board of National Estimates (BNE) after conferences with representatives of production offices for agreement on subjects and the allocation of production resources. The proposed schedule is disseminated to USIB representatives to give them an opportunity for review and conferences with their policy counterparts if they choose to do so. The final program is considered by the USIB and approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.

6. There is considerable variation from quarter to quarter, but about half of the schedule entries are estimates which are reissued on a periodic basis (such as the NIEs on Soviet military capabilities); approximately one fourth are estimates which are scheduled on the basis of a specific request via policy channels and about one fourth are entered into the schedule on the initiative of the BNE in the expectation that the estimates will address problems to be faced by policy makers within the time frame of the document.

7. Direct contact between intelligence and policy making levels takes place on occasion during development of the NIE schedule, but it is not regular or formalized. The Director of National Estimates has informally asked the Chief of the Net Assessment Group, NSC Staff, to serve as a funnel for input of NSC proposals concerning estimates.

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Some intelligence production personnel with geographic specialties maintain liaison with policy and operational offices involved with that same geographic area. The present system, however, does not provide for inputs from outside the intelligence community which explicitly indicate that top level officials personally have concurred in the proposed NIE schedule or have suggested deletions or additions of specific subjects relating to their responsibilities.

8. In order to provide a formal mechanism for regular inputs from the policy making levels and to provide the intelligence community with more direct indication as to the needs of top level consumers, it is proposed that the draft NIE schedule as approved by the Director of National Estimates be distributed to members of the NSCIC Working Group at the same time it goes to USIB representatives. Those Working Group representatives who represent NSCIC principals would be requested to provide the comments and/or concurrence of their principals on each quarterly schedule to the Chairman, NSCIC Working Group, and to the Director of National Estimates. This would increase assurance that the BNE is working on NIEs which deal with problem areas identified as being of significance to the planning and decision making requirements of top level consumers. These responses also would provide a channel for requests from the NSCIC principals for NSIEs.

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Participation by Non-USIB Agencies  
in the NIE/SNIE Process

9. At the present time, representatives of non-USIB organizations do not participate in the drafting of terms of reference for NIEs and SNIEs, or in the actual consideration of draft estimates during the process which leads to USIB consideration.

10. There is growing recognition, however, that in some areas the interests of non-USIB organizations are such that the intelligence product will be improved by the inclusion of representatives of non-USIB organizations. The expansion of participation by non-USIB agencies involved in international economic, financial and trade problems in activities of the USIB Economic Intelligence Committee is an illustration of this.

11. It could well be that participation by personnel representing policy and operational levels of the NSC Staff, the Department of State and the Department of Defense in the drafting of terms of reference and in the review of draft NIEs and SNIEs would improve the likelihood that the final estimate will be of optimum value to its users.

12. Participation of representatives from policy levels of the government in the evolution of a National Intelligence Estimate would represent a distinct departure from the concept that there should be a complete separation of intelligence activities from policy considerations. On the other hand, such participation offers at least the possibility of enhancing the probability that the estimate will include consideration of the questions on which intelligence

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judgments will have a distinct bearing when the subject to which the estimate applies is being handled at the policy levels. The likelihood, or even the chance, that such participation could result in improving the responsiveness of NIEs and SNIEs to the needs of top level consumers suggests that the effort should be made, at least on an experimental basis.

13. It is proposed, therefore, that the NSCIC Working Group recommend to the Director of Central Intelligence that the Director of National Estimates be requested to invite the participation of appropriate representatives from the NSC Staff, the Department of State and the Department of Defense when he considers that the subject of the NIE or SNIE is one in which such participation by personnel from outside the intelligence community would be useful.

14. It is further proposed that the Director of National Estimates prepare an appraisal of the usefulness of this procedure after a period of test and that he submit his comments and recommendations to the Director of Central Intelligence as basis for a DCI report to the NSCIC.

#### Systematic Evaluation of NIEs and SNIEs

15. Various attempts have been made in the past two decades to elicit consumer evaluations of intelligence products. Most of such attempts have involved the use of questionnaires sent to recipients of the various documents. In no cases have the results of general surveys been deemed adequate to provide direct basis for revision of a major production program.

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16. At Annex A is a description of surveys which have been made of user reactions to National Intelligence Estimates. In quite marked contrast to the general surveys was the success achieved when the DCI in 1969 asked the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for their views or suggestions as to how NIEs on Soviet military subjects might be made "most useful" to them. (Pages A-5 - 7 of Annex A described this exchange.) This correspondence results in a major revision of the format of these NIEs and a marked expansion of the material included in the annexes.

17. The success of this effort suggests that involvement of these same top level officials, or their representatives, in the evaluation of NIEs and SNIEs on a continuing basis would provide valuable inputs for the improvement of the national intelligence estimates process.

18. Inasmuch as the NSCIC Working Group has been created to support the NSCIC in its charge to provide substantive intelligence guidance to the intelligence community, it appears appropriate that the Working Group members be tasked with a responsibility for providing feedback to the Working Group Chairman and to the Director of National Estimates on each NIE and SNIE which is published.

19. Attached at Annex B is a copy of the questionnaire which would be used. It is proposed that the Chairman of the NSCIC Working Group forward a copy of each NIE and SNIE as it is published, along with the questionnaire, to those members of the Working Group

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who represent NSCIC principals. Those Working Group members would be charged with furnishing the Chairman of the Working Group and the Director of National Estimates with their evaluations of each NIE and SNIE.

20. Over a period of time these assembled comments should provide guidance to the Director of National Estimates as to how the various high level users of the NIEs and SNIEs - as represented on the NSCIC - consider the estimates could be improved in content, style, format and overall responsiveness to policy needs. These comments would provide a vehicle by which consumers who may be critical of the depth of analysis or of the approach used in a particular estimate can make these reactions known to those who are responsible for preparing estimates in that subject matter area.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

21. It is recommended that the NSCIC Working Group approve the letter at Annex C for forwarding to the NSCIC. Upon approval by the NSCIC, this letter would be sent by the NSCIC Chairman to the Director of Central Intelligence as guidance.

(Note: Annex C has not been drafted, pending approval of the approach set forth in this paper. The recommendation would put in action form the three actions which have been described in the foregoing text.)

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ANNEX A

## SURVEYS OF USER REACTIONS TO NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES

1. The expansion of the U. S. intelligence community since World War II has resulted, among other things, in a marked increase in the output of intelligence products--estimates, serial publications, reports, bulletins, memoranda, etc. Wide variation exists in the audiences to which individual products are addressed and in the number of copies which are disseminated. Because of concern as to whether the right audience was being reached or whether the products themselves were responsive to the needs of consumers, various intelligence organizations have conducted surveys of one type or another to measure consumer reactions, usually in the interest of obtaining comments which would provide basis for improvement of the product. The following paragraphs describe the more important of such efforts relating to National Intelligence Estimates, and an assessment of the results achieved.

### 2. Survey of 1955

a. In February 1955 the Director of Central Intelligence asked the Board of National Estimates to conduct an informal survey of the use which consumers made of National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's). The survey, which was undertaken after four years experience with the national estimate system, was intended to shed light on (1) whether NIE's were circulated appropriately; (2) who, besides the National Security Council, were the ultimate consumers; (3) how extensively NIE's were actually used by these consumers; and (4) the extent to which, as then written, the NIE's met such needs.

b. The survey was conducted in two stages. The first was a written questionnaire addressed to all offices and agencies receiving NIE's and intended to indicate NIE dissemination within each agency. The second stage was a series of interviews with a sample of policy-maker consumers to ascertain what use they actually made of NIE's. The survey was not intended to obtain opinions regarding the adequacy of NIE content or judgments on changes to make them

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more useful. The primary goal was to establish the distribution pattern of NIE's and to indicate the kinds of uses to which they were put.

c. The survey indicated that an average of 249 NIE's were distributed regularly to the White House, the NSC, the Operations Coordinating Board and the major departments and agencies with national security responsibilities. Many of these were further distributed to major commands and missions outside Washington.

d. Only a relatively few NIE's (selected by intelligence and screening officers) were seen by the President and department or agency heads, and in such cases these top-level individuals usually read only the conclusions, briefs, or selected portions. The exceptions were most likely to be NIE's dealing with crisis situations requiring urgent and high-level policy decisions. NIE's were, however, found to be extensively read by second and third echelon officials in major departments and agencies and by various staffs responsible for national security planning and execution. It appeared that some NIE's did not reach all of the departmental policy or planning levels or other key officials who might have found them useful. In some cases, this appeared to result from failure of subordinates to pass the NIE's to their chiefs, and in others the criteria for distribution appeared to be overly restrictive.

e. NIE's were found to be most generally used for background purposes, although some were used in working on specific planning and policy problems. The majority of users indicated that the format and problem coverage of NIE's were adequate, but many expressed dissatisfaction with particular NIE's. There were complaints that the NIE's were too long to be read in full by top-level individuals; they were said by some to be too general for detailed use in policy planning and execution; and some were said to be not relevant or sufficiently timely for use in consideration of specific policy problems. Overall importance of such complaints was not considered sufficient to warrant action to alter the format or content of NIE's. Each Intelligence Advisory Committee\* member was asked to reexamine the pattern of NIE distribution so as to improve the usefulness of NIE's to the policy, planning and executive branches of his agency. Each IAC agency was

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\* Succeeded by the U. S. Intelligence Board on 15 September 1958

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requested to brief new key officials within its department on the nature of the NIE and the means at their disposal for requesting NIE's responsive to specific intelligence problems they might have.

3. Conference with the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (1957)

The DCI, Director of National Estimates and his BNE members met on 25 July 1957 with Robert W. Bowie, Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning to discuss the form and content of the NIE program. Mr. Bowie's suggestions to enhance the usefulness of NIE's to the policy planning process were as follows:

- a. There was undue emphasis on precise statements of probability, with too little discussion of underlying factors.
- b. In many cases, it would be useful to discuss more possibilities, even if they had only a 20 percent chance of eventuating.
- c. The estimate should show the degree to which predictions were based on evidence as opposed to judgment.
- d. Estimates should put more stress on the degree to which U. S. action could affect the predicted line of development, and what kinds of U. S. action could have impact.
- e. NIE's were not very readable, even on interesting subjects--the conclusions were "dehydrated" and lacked flavor. He also suggested that the IAC promulgate as "think pieces" a series of papers written by a single person or a small group (in the manner for Foreign Affairs articles) for consideration by policy-makers.

4. Survey of NIE Distribution (1959-1960)

- a. This survey effort had two aspects: (1) the circulation of a questionnaire enclosed in seven selected NIE's published during the period July 1959 to February 1960 to obtain certain detailed information regarding the readership of NIE's, and (2) an inquiry to the distribution offices of the USIB agencies to

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determine how NIE distribution is controlled. The latter is not relevant to the present study. The survey was undertaken to investigate the nature of and causes for an apparent large increase in NIE distribution from 250 in 1956; by 1960 some 365 copies of NIE's were regularly being sent to recipients according to a standard distribution list, and about 85 more were held in reserve for special distribution. The survey ascertained that the substantial increase since 1956 was attributed to the following factors:

- (1) Natural expansion of readership as the utility and significance of NIE's became more firmly established throughout the government.
- (2) The growing number of senior officials who required NIE's in carrying out their responsibilities.
- (3) An increasing number of users in the intelligence community itself.
- (4) The succession of world crises which generated increased interest in national intelligence on the part of commanders and planners.
- (5) A general increase in the number of people in the government concerned with the communist threat throughout the world, developments in modern technological warfare, and the capabilities and intentions of the Soviet Bloc.
- (6) The addition of new readers overseas--political advisors, ambassadors, and military planners and commanders.
- (7) Agency reorganizations, including changes in locations of offices.
- (8) An increase in the size, responsibility, and complexity of agencies served by NIE's.
- (9) The establishment or expansion of reference and library facilities in the USIB agencies.

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(10) An increase in the number of NIE's released to foreign governments. (From about 26 to 45)

(11) An apparent increase in readers whose need to know might be marginal.

b. An analysis of the returns from 636 respondents of the questionnaire addressed to NIE recipients indicated that about 50 percent were engaged in intelligence, 19 percent had responsibilities in policy planning and coordination, and 8 percent were in operations. Only 7 percent listed themselves in the area of research. However, a substantial number of readers (34 percent) indicated that they read only the NIE conclusions. The questionnaire (at Tab 1) did not solicit ideas on how NIE's might be improved.

5. Queries to Secretaries of Defense and State re Soviet Military Estimates (1969)

a. In November 1969 the DCI asked the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for their views or suggestions as to how National Estimates on Soviet military subjects might be made "most useful" to them. Questions included: (1) is the division by subject (Strategic Attack, Strategic Defense, and General Purpose Forces) the best way of presenting the estimates; (2) is the amount of detail presented excessive and should there be different types of estimates for different readers; and (3) do existing procedures provide intelligence judgments of most vital interest, together with adequate evidence or argument, and are dissents presented adequately?

b. The Secretary of State offered no "fundamental" criticism, but his suggestions for "refinements" were as follows:

- There could be "summary estimates" for the top policy makers, more comprehensive than the "conclusions" sections of the then current estimates, but more condensed than the then current estimates. This would permit the basic NIE to be more detailed and complete with a fuller presentation of the evidence. Annexes could provide background information on major issues, and there could be greater use of maps, charts and graphs.

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- There should be a greater effort to evaluate Soviet doctrine and strategy together with discussion of the fundamental differences of opinion within the intelligence community. These could be incorporated in the "basic estimate" and this might obviate the need to issue a separate NIE 11-4 \* as frequently as in the past.
- The "summary estimates" would be written after the basic estimates were completed and would give an over-view of major Soviet weapons systems and describe significant changes in Soviet forces. They would also include a discussion of the general nature of Soviet military expenditures. The "summary estimates" for 11-3 \*\* and 11-8 \*\*\* should be combined into a single paper so policy makers would have in one document an assessment of the main elements of information on Soviet strategic forces which have to be taken into consideration in calculating the US-Soviet strategic balance. This would be useful, for example, in discussing US options for the SALT negotiations.
- The estimates might contain a brief statistical summary of US forces, including forward projections drawn from the OSC FYDP, to give the reader a basis for comparing US and Soviet forces.

c. The suggestions of the Secretary of Defense were as follows:

- Consideration should be given to relegating much of the detailed quantitative and qualitative analyses of Soviet weaponry to appropriate appendices. This would leave in the main body of the NIE only the more critical aspects of strategic weapons systems. The main body should also contain changes, disagreements of the intelligence community, and levels of confidence inherent in the principal judgments.

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\* "Main Trends in Soviet Military Policy"

\*\* "Soviet Strategic Air and Missile Defenses"

\*\*\* "Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Attack"

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- The estimates, especially the strategic attack and defense papers, should be revised and updated more often, perhaps quarterly. (The NIE on an annual basis was said to be of questionable usefulness a few months after its issuance.)
- It would be useful to include five-year estimates in the NIE's, perhaps less precise than the short-term estimates but more definitive than the ten-year trends of the then current estimates.
- Each NIE should have a section comparing major judgments of the previous NIE with the current judgment. Divergencies could be explained and tendencies to consistently over-estimate or under-estimate should be brought to the attention of the policy-maker so that he could determine the "hedge" factor he must introduce in decisions regarding defense programming and planning.

d. The change which both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense recommended--that a condensed statement of the principal findings of Soviet military estimates be prepared for the top policy-makers-- was adopted and NIE's on these subjects now have a lengthy summary and conclusions section at their beginning. Another suggestion of the Secretary of State was also adopted and resulted in a deeper probe of Soviet military strategy. NIE 11-4 (now "Issues and Options in Soviet Military Policy") has been retitled and considerably expanded in scope and depth. The Secretary of Defense's suggestion to include five-year estimates of Soviet force levels was also adopted, but in the form of several alternate projections for force levels, depending on assumptions as to the success of SALT talks, US alternate force levels, etc.

#### 6. Meeting with the White House Staff in 1970

The Board of National Estimates and its staff members conducted a series of meetings in 1970 with the staff of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs concerning the form and content of military estimates. As a result of these meetings, a great deal more factual material was included in the estimates, together with

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an expanded discussion of the factors leading to the conclusions of the estimate. On 8 March 1971 the President commended the DCI and "the entire intelligence community" for NIE 11-8-70 which the President said was a considerable improvement over the previous version. He stated that he found particularly useful:

"--The frequent sharply-defined, clearly argued discussions of the various contested issues.

"--The attempt to incorporate a wide range of sources, such as clandestine reports and Soviet SALT statements.

"--The alternative force models based on explicit differences in underlying assumptions and the attempt to define which were the more likely models.

"--The quantitative detail for each model which illustrates the differences between the models and gives an operational meaning to some of the general statements."

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE CONSUMER EVALUATION

I. PURPOSE

The purpose of this evaluation is to provide explicit feedback to Intelligence managers and producers from consumer users who have been specifically assigned this responsibility by their Department or Agency for the estimate listed below.

NOTE: THIS EVALUATION IS NOT TO BE PREPARED BY INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS. IT IS A NON-INTELLIGENCE USER EVALUATION OF AN INTELLIGENCE PRODUCT.

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II. INSTRUCTIONS

Evaluators are requested to complete this evaluation within 30 days following assignment by their Department or Agency.

The Security Classification of the Evaluation Report will be determined by the evaluator who will select whatever classification is required based upon the classification of the estimate and the data included by the evaluator in his report.

The completed evaluation will be addressed to:

Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence  
For the Intelligence Community  
Chief, Product Review Group  
Room 6E-18  
CIA Headquarters  
Washington, D.C. 20505

III. ESTIMATE AND EVALUATOR IDENTIFICATION

NIE NO. \_\_\_\_\_ (or SNIE No.)

NIE or SNIE Title \_\_\_\_\_

Evaluators Organization \_\_\_\_\_  
& Address \_\_\_\_\_

Contact Name &  
Telephone No. for  
Inquiries

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Name)

\_\_\_\_\_  
(Phone)

IV. EVALUATION FORMAT

The evaluation is divided into six brief areas of inquiry with a final section in which the evaluator may make such comments and suggestions as is considered desirable. The seven specific areas of inquiry are as follows:

- |           |  |
|-----------|--|
| Section 1 | Estimate Utility                       |
| Section 2 | Estimate Format                        |
| Section 3 | Factual Data                           |
| Section 4 | Expressions of Change                  |
| Section 5 | Expression of Uncertainties            |
| Section 6 | Expression of Alternatives             |
| Section 7 | Evaluator Summary and/or Added Comment |

V. EVALUATION REPORT

Section 1: Estimate Utility

Question 1.1 The primary use(s) of this estimate by the evaluator and his organization is (are):  
(Check one or more)

Policy Planning\_\_\_\_\_

Operations Planning\_\_\_\_\_

Military Force Planning\_\_\_\_\_

Military R&D Planning\_\_\_\_\_

Other\_\_\_\_\_ (Specify) \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Question 1.2 Does some other source currently satisfy your need for this estimative information in a better fashion (i.e., such as NSSM's, Departmental Intelligence Estimates, etc.)

Question 1.3 How would you rate the utility of this estimate:

Absolute Necessity\_\_\_\_\_

Very Useful\_\_\_\_\_

Useful\_\_\_\_\_

Nice to Have\_\_\_\_\_

Of Little or No Use\_\_\_\_\_

Section 2: Estimate Format

The purpose of this section is to determine whether the estimate format meets the needs of the evaluator and his organization.

Question 2.1 Is the Estimate Format Satisfactory?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_ No \_\_\_\_\_

Question 2.2 If the answer to Question 2.1 above is "No", how does the evaluator suggest that the format be changed? To accomplish what purposes?

Section 3: Factual Data

The purpose of this query is to determine whether the presentation of factual data in the estimate meets the need of the evaluator and his organization.

Question 3.1 Is the factual data in the estimate presented in (a) sufficient detail, (b) too much detail, (c) not enough detail?

Answer: \_\_\_\_\_

Question 3.2 If the response to Question 3.1 above is (b) or (c), what explicit suggestions does the evaluator have, and for what purposes?

Response to Question 3.2

Section 4: Expressions of Change

The purpose of this query is to determine whether the expression of changes in factual or estimative data meets the needs of the evaluator and his organization.

Question 4.1 Were stated conditions of change in factual data or estimate (or lack of change) dealt with to your satisfaction?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Question 4.2 If "No", please explain and offer your suggestions for presentation.

Section 5: Expression of Uncertainties

The purpose of this query is to determine whether the estimate contained adequate expression of the uncertainties related to the data or the estimates.

Question 5.1 Did the estimate treat the full range of uncertainty for your purpose?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Question 5.2 If answer is "No", please explain where you believe weaknesses occurred and suggest any steps which, in your judgement, would improve the treatment of uncertainty.

Section 6: Expression of Alternatives

The purpose of this query is to determine whether the estimate presented a sufficient range of alternatives to meet the needs of the evaluator.

Question 6.1 Did the estimate present a sufficient range of alternatives for your purposes?

Yes \_\_\_\_\_

No \_\_\_\_\_

Question 6.2 If answer to above is "No", please explain and offer any suggestions you feel would improve the presentation.



Section 7: Evaluator Summary and/or Added Comment

The purpose of this section is to allow the evaluator to present such additional comments or summary as he considers useful as feedback to Intelligence.

Response to Section 7:

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Excerpt from MOR by [ ] 2 May 1972, Subj: Meeting with Andrew Marshall, NSC Staff

5. Andy considers it would be useful to submit proposed NIE schedules to the NSCIC in order to get formal committee comment for use by ONE. Andy and I both recognize that the individual members of the NSCIC could have access to the proposed NIE schedules under the present dissemination given these papers but making the preparation of comments an NSCIC task would be a means of obtaining formal comment.

6. Andy suggests that it might be well to consider a different way of presenting terms of reference for the NIE's in order to elicit user comments. The present terms of reference are primarily intended for internal intelligence audiences in order to advise the various production agencies as to the kinds of inputs which are needed. In addition to this, however, a separate "terms of reference" by whatever title which identified the major issues intended to be addressed in the NIE would provide a basis on which high-level users could submit comments.

7. Andy agreed that the possibility of requesting policy-level users to indicate their near-term problems on which intelligence inputs would be particularly valuable deserves exploration. This, in effect, would be requesting the users of intelligence to indicate those areas of current intelligence in which they expect to be the most interested over the next three to six months.

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Chief, PRG/IC

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Distribution: